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SMITH, Chief Judge.
 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”) protects only those individuals who are at 
least forty years of age. The question in this case is 
whether a disparate-impact claim is cognizable where a 
“subgroup” of employees at the upper end of that 
range—in this case, employees aged fifty and older—
were alleged to have been disfavored relative to younger 
employees. 
 We answer in the affirmative. Our decision is 
dictated by the plain text of the statute as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court. In particular, the ADEA prohibits 
disparate impacts based on age, not forty-and-older 
identity. A rule that disallowed subgroups would ignore 
genuine statistical disparities that could otherwise be 
actionable through application of the plain text of the 
statute. Although several of our sister circuits have ruled 
to the contrary, their reasoning relies primarily on policy 
arguments that we do not find persuasive. 
 We will therefore reverse the judgment of the 
District Court based on its interpretation of the ADEA. 
We will also vacate the District Court’s order excluding 
the testimony of plaintiffs’ statistics expert and remand 
for further Daubert proceedings. We will affirm in all 
other respects. 
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I 
 Defendant Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC (“PGW”) 
manufactures automotive glass in Harmarville, 
Pennsylvania. PGW also owns (1) GTS Services, a 
software business, (2) PGW Auto Glass, an automotive 
replacement-glass distribution business, (3) LYNX 
Services, an insurance claims administrator, and 
(4) Aquapel, a glass treatment supplier. 
 In 2008, the automobile industry began to falter. 
PGW engaged in several reductions in force (“RIFs”) to 
offset deteriorating sales. The RIF of relevance to this 
case occurred on March 31, 2009, and terminated the 
employment of approximately one hundred salaried 
employees in over forty locations or divisions. Individual 
unit directors had broad discretion in selecting whom to 
terminate. PGW did not train those directors in how to 
implement the RIF. Nor did PGW employ any written 
guidelines or policies, conduct any disparate-impact 
analysis, review prospective RIF terminees with counsel, 
or document why any particular employee was selected 
for inclusion in the RIF. 
 Plaintiffs Rudolph A. Karlo, William S. 
Cunningham, Jeffrey Marietti, David Meixelberger, 
Mark K. McLure, Benjamin D. Thompson, and Richard 
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Csukas1 worked in PGW’s Manufacturing Technology 
division. They were terminated as part of the March 2009 
RIF by their supervisor, Gary Cannon. Each was over 
fifty years old at the time. 
 In January 2010, plaintiffs filed charges of 
employment discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Thereafter, they 
received a Dismissal and Notice of Rights from the 
EEOC, and this lawsuit followed. Plaintiffs brought a 
putative ADEA collective action, asserting three claims: 
(1) disparate treatment, (2) disparate impact, and 
(3) retaliation as to only Karlo and McLure. 
 On plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification, 
the District Court ruled that ADEA subgroups are 
cognizable, and conditionally certified a collective action 
to be comprised of employees terminated by the RIF who 
were at least fifty years old at the time. See Karlo v. 
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 880 F. Supp. 2d 629 
(W.D. Pa. 2012). In addition to the named plaintiffs, 
eleven individuals opted in. Three voluntarily dismissed 
their claims and four settled. Four opt-ins remained: 
Michael Breen, a former production supervisor at a plant 
in Crestline, Ohio; Matthew Clawson, a former Project 
Engineer in Evansville, Indiana; Stephen Shaw, a former 
                                                 
 1 McLure, Thompson, and Csukas settled their 
claims prior to this appeal. 
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marketing manager in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and John 
Titus, a former Area Services Manager in Irving, Texas. 
 On June 26, 2013, the case was transferred to 
another district judge. PGW filed a motion to decertify 
the collective action. On March 31, 2014, the District 
Court granted the motion, concluding that the collective 
action should be decertified because the opt-in plaintiffs’ 
claims are factually dissimilar from those of the named 
plaintiffs. See Karlo, 2014 WL 1317595. 
 PGW then filed motions to exclude plaintiffs’ 
experts. Of relevance to this appeal, PGW sought to 
exclude three areas of expert testimony. First, Dr. 
Michael Campion was prepared to offer statistical 
evidence in favor of plaintiffs’ disparate-impact claim. 
Second, Dr. Campion intended to offer his expert opinion 
on “reasonable” human-resources practices during a RIF. 
And third, Dr. Anthony G. Greenwald proposed to testify 
as to age-related implicit-bias studies. By Order dated 
July 13, 2015, the District Court excluded the testimony 
of each. See Karlo, 2015 WL 4232600. 
 PGW moved for summary judgment on each 
claim. On September 3, 2015, the District Court ruled on 
the motions, granting them in part and denying them in 
part. See Karlo, 2015 WL 5156913. As to plaintiffs’ 
disparate-impact claims, the District Court granted 
summary judgment on two grounds: (1) plaintiffs’ fifty-
and-older disparate-impact claim is not cognizable under 
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the ADEA; and (2) plaintiffs’ lack of evidence to support 
their claim of disparate impact following the exclusion of 
Dr. Campion’s statistics-related testimony. The District 
Court also granted summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ 
disparate-treatment claims. That ruling has not been 
appealed. Finally, the District Court denied summary 
judgment as to Karlo’s and McLure’s individual 
retaliation claims. 
 On October 2, 2015, the District Court certified the 
disparate-impact and disparate-treatment claims for final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See Karlo, 2015 WL 5782062. This 
appeal followed. Plaintiffs seek reversal of the District 
Court’s summary judgment decision and statistics-related 
Daubert ruling regarding their disparate-impact claims. 
Plaintiffs also appeal the District Court’s other Daubert 
rulings and its order decertifying the collective action. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 The parties dispute whether our jurisdiction 
extends to one or all named plaintiffs. PGW concedes 
that Karlo perfected an appeal, but argues that the other 
remaining named plaintiffs—Cunningham, Marietti, and 
Meixelberger—were not identified in the Notice of 
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Appeal, and therefore did not preserve their appellate 
rights under Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 
U.S. 312, 317 (1988).2 We conclude that plaintiffs 
complied with Rule 3(c) with respect to all named 
plaintiffs. 
  Rule 3(c)(1)(A) requires a notice of appeal to 
“specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming 
each one in the caption or body of the notice,” but that 
rule is relaxed where “an attorney [is] representing more 
than one party.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(A). The attorney 
“may describe those parties with such terms as ‘all 
plaintiffs,’ ‘the defendants,’ ‘the plaintiffs A, B, et al.,’ or 
‘all defendants except X.’” Id. 
 The Notice of Appeal here states, “Plaintiffs in the 
above-captioned case hereby appeal . . . an order . . . 
entering judgment against Plaintiffs . . . on Plaintiffs’ 
discrimination claims . . . .”  A.1 (emphases added). The 
                                                 
 2 Although it does not influence our analysis, the 
Notice of Appeal’s caption has a perfectly innocent 
explanation. Following Rule 54(b) certification, the 
District Court amended the caption by order to identify 
only Karlo and McLure as plaintiffs because their 
retaliation claims were the only claims remaining after 
summary judgment. The Notice of Appeal used the 
District Court’s updated caption. 
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use of “Plaintiffs” is equivalent to “the defendants” in the 
example provided by the Rule.3 We have observed that 
“[t]he purpose of Rule 3(c)’s identification requirement is 
to provide notice to the court and the opposing parties of 
the identity of the appellants.” In re Cont’l Airlines, 125 
F.3d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 1997). Because all of the 
remaining named plaintiffs were identically situated as to 
this appeal, were represented by the same counsel, and 
were each identified by name in the District Court’s 
“order . . . entering judgment against [all named] 
Plaintiffs,” as referenced on the face of the Notice, Rule 
3(c)’s purpose is amply served, and “the intent to appeal 
is otherwise clear from the notice.” Fed. R. App. P. 
3(c)(4); see United States v. Carelock, 459 F.3d 437, 441 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has stated that 
courts should ‘liberally construe the requirements of Rule 
3.’” (quoting Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992))). 
III 
 The central question in this case is whether so-
called “subgroup” disparate-impact claims are cognizable 
under the ADEA. We hold that they are. 
                                                 
 3 The phrase “in the above captioned case” does 
not change our interpretation. We read the Notice to 
mean “Plaintiffs in [Civil Action No. 10-1283] hereby 
appeal.” 
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 Disparate-impact claims in ADEA cases ordinarily 
evaluate the effect of a facially neutral policy on all 
employees who are at least forty years old—that is, all 
employees covered by the ADEA. In this case, plaintiffs 
claim to have identified a policy that disproportionately 
impacted a subgroup of that population: employees older 
than fifty. But because the policy favored younger 
members of the protected class, adding those individuals 
to the comparison group washes out the statistical 
evidence of a disparity. 
 Plaintiffs’ claim is cognizable under the ADEA. 
Specifically, we hold that an ADEA disparate-impact 
claim may proceed when a plaintiff offers evidence that a 
specific, facially neutral employment practice caused a 
significantly disproportionate adverse impact based on 
age. Plaintiffs can demonstrate such impact with various 
forms of evidence, including forty-and-older 
comparisons, subgroup comparisons, or more 
sophisticated statistical modeling, so long as that 
evidence meets the usual standards for admissibility. A 
contrary rule would ignore significant age-based 
disparities. Where such disparities exist, they must be 
justified pursuant to the ADEA’s relatively broad 
defenses. 
A 
 We begin with an overview of the statutory 
scheme. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
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1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., 
makes it unlawful for an employer: 
 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or otherwise discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s age; or 
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee 
in order to comply with this chapter. 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a). “Except for substitution of the word 
‘age,’ for the words ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin,’ the language of that provision in the ADEA is 
identical to that found in § 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (Title VII).” Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 
U.S. 228, 233 (2005). But unlike Title VII, which 
protects individuals of every race, color, religion, sex, 
and national origin, the ADEA’s protection is “limited to 
individuals who are at least 40 years of age.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 631(a). 
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 ADEA claims may proceed under a disparate-
impact or disparate-treatment theory. See Smith, 544 U.S. 
at 231–32. Disparate treatment is governed by 
§ 623(a)(1); disparate impact is governed by § 623(a)(2). 
Id. at 235 (plurality opinion); cf. Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988); Connecticut v. 
Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446–47 (1982). 
 The disparate-impact theory of recovery was first 
recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971), a Title VII case. Unlike claims of disparate 
treatment, disparate-impact claims do not require proof 
of discriminatory intent. Disparate impact redresses 
policies that are “fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation.” Id. at 431. To that end, disparate-impact 
claims “usually focus[] on statistical disparities . . . .” 
Watson, 487 U.S. at 987. 
 To state a prima facie case for disparate impact 
under the ADEA, a plaintiff must (1) identify a specific, 
facially neutral policy, and (2) proffer statistical evidence 
that the policy caused a significant age-based disparity. 
Cf. NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 
464, 476–77 (3d Cir. 2011). Once a plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case, an employer can defend by arguing that 
the challenged practice was based on “reasonable factors 
other than age”—commonly referred to as the “RFOA” 
defense. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7. 
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 “[T]he scope of disparate-impact liability under the 
ADEA is narrower than under Title VII” because of 
“[t]wo textual differences” between the statutes. Smith, 
544 U.S. at 240. First, the RFOA defense imposes a 
lighter burden on the employer than its Title VII 
counterpart, the “business necessity” defense. Under the 
ADEA, the employer only needs to show that it relied on 
a “reasonable” factor, not that “there are [no] other ways 
for the employer to achieve its goals . . . .” Smith, 544 
U.S. at 243. Congress’s decision to impose a relatively 
light burden on employers “is consistent with the fact that 
age, unlike race or other classifications protected by Title 
VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s 
capacity to engage in certain types of employment.” Id. at 
240. The second textual difference requires ADEA 
plaintiffs to “isolat[e] and identify[] the specific 
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for 
any observed statistical disparities.” Id. at 241 (quoting 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 
(1989)). Congress stripped that requirement from Title 
VII when it amended the statute in 1991, but it remains 
operative under the ADEA. Id. at 240; see 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e–2(k). 
B 
The ADEA’s disparate-impact provision makes it 
unlawful for an employer “to adversely affect [an 
employee’s] status . . . because of such individual’s age.” 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). This plain text supports the 
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viability of subgroup claims. See Hardt v. Reliance 
Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010) (“We 
must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language 
according to its terms.”). Two aspects of the text guide 
our decision in this case: (1) the focus on age as the 
relevant protected trait, as interpreted by O’Connor v. 
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), 
and (2) the focus on the rights of individuals, as 
interpreted by Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
Our interpretation is further supported by the ADEA’s 
remedial purpose. 
1 
We begin with the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
opinion in O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers 
Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), an ADEA disparate-
treatment case. O’Connor clarified that the ADEA 
proscribes age discrimination, not forty-and-over 
discrimination. The same interpretation applies to 
identical operative language in the ADEA’s disparate-
impact provision. 
The plaintiff in O’Connor was fifty-six years old 
when he was fired and replaced with a younger worker. 
517 U.S. at 309. The plaintiff’s replacement, however, 
was over the age of forty, and therefore within the class 
of individuals protected by the ADEA. Id. The Fourth 
Circuit held that the ADEA prima facie case requires the 
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replacement to be younger than forty years old. Id. at 
310. The Supreme Court reversed. 
The Supreme Court began its analysis with the 
plain text of the statute: “The discrimination prohibited 
by the ADEA is discrimination ‘because of [an] 
individual’s age,’ though the prohibition is ‘limited to 
individuals who are at least 40 years of age.’” 517 U.S. at 
312 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). On the 
basis of that text, the Court held that the ADEA 
 does not ban discrimination against 
employees because they are aged 40 or 
older; it bans discrimination against 
employees because of their age, but limits 
the protected class to those who are 40 or 
older. The fact that one person in the 
protected class has lost out to another person 
in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so 
long as he has lost out because of his age. 
Id. Although the ADEA protects a class of individuals at 
least forty years old, it “prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of age and not class membership . . . .” Id. at 313. It 
is therefore “utterly irrelevant” that the beneficiary of age 
discrimination was also over the age of forty. Id. at 312. 
Accordingly, the proposed limitation on the prima facie 
case—replacement by an employee younger than forty—
lacked a “logical connection” to the plain text of the 
ADEA. Id. at 311–12. As the Supreme Court later 
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reaffirmed, “[it] is beyond reasonable doubt[] that the 
ADEA was concerned to protect a relatively old worker 
from discrimination that works to the advantage of the 
relatively young.” Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. 
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 590–91 (2004). 
 The Supreme Court’s reasoning ineluctably leads 
to our conclusion that subgroup claims are cognizable. 
Simply put, evidence that a policy disfavors employees 
older than fifty is probative of the relevant statutory 
question: whether the policy creates a disparate impact 
“because of such individual[s’] age.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(a)(2). Requiring the comparison group to include 
employees in their forties has no “logical connection” to 
that prohibition. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 311. 
 The key insight from O’Connor is that the forty-
and-older line drawn by § 631(a) constrains the ADEA’s 
general scope; it does not modify or define the ADEA’s 
substantive prohibition against “discriminat[ion] . . . 
because of such individual’s age.” § 623(a)(1). The 
ADEA protects against “age discrimination []as opposed 
to ‘40 or over’ discrimination . . . .” O’Connor, 517 U.S. 
at 312. 
 The disparate-impact provision uses the same 
operative phrase, “because of such individual’s age.” 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). Our interpretation of it, therefore, 
should be consistent with our interpretation of the 
disparate-treatment provision, § 623(a)(1). See, e.g., 
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Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 
332, 342 (1994) (“[I]dentical words used in different 
parts of the same act are intended to have the same 
meaning.”). Thus, “adversely affect . . . because of such 
individual’s age” must mean adversely affect based on 
age, not adversely affect based on forty-and-older status.4 
 O’Connor’s applicability is not diminished by the 
fact that it addressed a disparate-treatment claim. As 
demonstrated by the identical operative phrasing of 
§ 623(a)(1) and § 623(a)(2), the two types of claims share 
the same “ultimate legal issue . . . .” Watson, 487 U.S. at 
987; see also Teal, 457 U.S. at 455–56 (discussed infra 
Section III.B.2). Disparate-impact claims are primarily 
distinguished by “the factual issues that typically 
dominate”—namely, whether a facially neutral policy is 
                                                 
 4 In Cline, the Supreme Court interpreted the word 
“age” to take different meanings in different parts of the 
ADEA. 540 U.S. at 596. The Court distinguished 
between two alternative definitions: “any number of 
years lived, or . . . the longer span and concurrent aches 
that make youth look good.” Id. The Court determined 
that “[t]he presumption of uniform usage thus relents” 
when comparing § 623(a)(1) and § 623(f). Id. at 595. In 
this case, the presumption holds because § 623(a)(1) and 
§ 623(a)(2) employ “age” in virtually the same context. 
Both use “age” as in Cline’s second definition, to mean 
“old age.” 540 U.S. at 596. 
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discriminatory in operation. Watson, 487 U.S. at 987 
(emphasis added); see Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 n.5 (1981). A disparate 
impact “may in operation be functionally equivalent to 
intentional discrimination.” Watson, 487 U.S. at 987; see 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (“[D]isparate-
impact liability . . . plays a role in uncovering 
discriminatory intent[.]”). Our holding restores the parity 
described in Watson. Under the ADEA, both disparate 
impact and disparate treatment address the same ultimate 
legal issue: age discrimination. 
 We conclude that the Supreme Court’s analysis in 
O’Connor answers the question now before us. A 
specific, facially neutral policy that significantly 
disfavors employees over fifty years old supports a claim 
of disparate impact under the plain text of § 623(a)(2). 
Although the employer’s policy might favor younger 
members of the forty-and-over cohort, that is an “utterly 
irrelevant factor,” O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312, in 
evaluating whether a company’s oldest employees were 
disproportionately affected because of their age. 
2 
Our decision is further supported by the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 
(1982), a Title VII disparate-impact case. Teal confirms 
that, even under a disparate-impact theory, the plain text 
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of the statute is designed to protect the rights of 
individual employees, not the rights of a class. 
 In Teal, a Connecticut state agency used a two-step 
process to determine eligibility for promotions. First, 
Connecticut required applicants to take a written test. 
Second, Connecticut selected the employees for 
promotion out of the pool of candidates that passed the 
test. Id. at 443. Black applicants who failed the test sued, 
advancing evidence that black employees failed the 
written test at a significantly higher rate than white 
employees. In response, Connecticut argued that, at the 
second step of the process, the black employees who 
passed were given preferential treatment through an 
affirmative action program, counterbalancing the 
discriminatory effect of the written test. Connecticut 
argued that its two-step process promoted black 
employees at an overall higher rate than white 
employees. Id. at 444. 
 The Supreme Court rejected this so-called 
“bottom-line” defense and held that the purpose of Title 
VII “is the protection of the individual employee, rather 
than the protection of the minority group as a whole.” Id. 
at 453–54. “[F]avorable treatment of . . . members of 
these respondents’ racial group” did not justify 
discrimination against other members of the protected 
class. Id. at 454; see El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 
232, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Title VII operates not 
primarily to the benefit of racial or minority groups, but 
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to ensure that individual applicants receive the 
consideration they are due . . . .”). 
 This case presents a similar issue. The ADEA, like 
Title VII, protects individuals who are members of a 
protected class, not a class itself. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(a)(1) (proscribing forms of discrimination 
“because of such individual’s age”); id. § 623(a)(2) 
(same); id. § 631(a) (limiting the ADEA’s scope to 
“individuals who are at least 40 years of age”). Such 
protection under the statute does not disappear when a 
plaintiff advances a disparate-impact claim. Teal 
prohibits the use of a bottom-line statistic to justify 
ignoring a disproportionate impact against individuals 
that would otherwise be actionable under the plain text of 
the statute. That is precisely the problem subgroups are 
meant to address here. 
 As a result, Teal answers PGW’s argument that 
employees older than forty were, as a class, favored to 
keep their jobs. That is equivalent to Connecticut’s 
argument that black employees were collectively favored 
for promotions. The Supreme Court rejected that 
argument in Teal, and we reject it here. 
 Similar to the position of PGW and its amici in this 
case, the dissenting Justices in Teal accused the majority 
of “confus[ing] the distinction—uniformly recognized 
until today—between disparate impact and disparate 
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treatment.” 457 U.S. at 462 (Powell, J., dissenting). The 
majority responded as follows: 
The fact remains . . . that irrespective of the 
form taken by the discriminatory practice, an 
employer’s treatment of other members of 
the plaintiffs’ group can be of little comfort 
to the victims of . . . discrimination. Title VII 
does not permit the victim of a facially 
discriminatory policy to be told that he has 
not been wronged because other persons of 
his or her race or sex were hired. That answer 
is no more satisfactory when it is given to 
victims of a policy that is facially neutral but 
practically discriminatory. Every individual 
employee is protected against both 
discriminatory treatment and practices that 
are fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation. 
Id. at 455–56 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). The same reasoning applies to this case. The 
ADEA “does not permit the victim of a facially 
discriminatory policy to be told that he has not been 
wronged because other persons” aged forty or older were 
preferred. Id. at 455. “That answer is no more 
satisfactory when it is given to victims of a policy that is 
facially neutral but practically discriminatory.” Id. 
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3 
PGW and its amici maintain that disparate-impact 
claims generally rely on comparisons between entire 
classes. Even in Teal, for example, plaintiffs’ evidence 
showed that the written test caused a disparate impact on 
black employees as a class. 457 U.S. at 443. That general 
focus on groups, however, is explained by the fact that 
Title VII protects group identities like race and sex. The 
trait protected by the ADEA, age, is qualitatively 
different. 
 “The term ‘age’ employed by the ADEA is not . . . 
comparable to the terms ‘race’ or ‘sex’ employed by Title 
VII.” Cline, 540 U.S. at 597. Age is a continuous 
variable, whereas race and sex are treated categorically in 
the mine-run of Title VII cases. See Bienkowski v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1506 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The 
ADEA does not lend itself to a bright-line age rule and in 
this respect differs from racial or sex discrimination 
cases . . . .”); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 
F.2d 1435, 1442 (11th Cir. 1985) (observing that age 
discrimination is “qualitatively different from race or sex 
discrimination” because “the basis of the discrimination 
is not a discre[te] and immutable characteristic of an 
employee which separates the members of the protected 
group indelibly from persons outside the protected 
group”). 
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 On account of that difference, the statistical 
techniques common in Title VII cases are not perfectly 
transferable to ADEA cases. If, for example, the 
comparison group in Teal omitted some black employees 
who took the written test, the statistics would likely have 
failed to address whether there was a disparate impact 
“because of . . . race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(2); 
see also id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). It would be unclear 
whether the test’s effects fell more harshly on individuals 
of a particular race without looking at how the test 
affected all members. But with the ADEA, by contrast, a 
comparison group that omits employees in their forties is 
fully capable of demonstrating disparate impact “because 
of . . . age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). 
 The forty-and-older line established in § 631(a) 
does not convert age into a binary trait. By its own terms, 
it imposes a “limit[ation]” on the “individuals” covered 
by “[t]he prohibitions in this chapter . . . .” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 631(a). It simply establishes “the age at which ADEA 
protection begins.” Maxfield v. Sinclair Int’l, 766 F.2d 
788, 792 (3d Cir. 1985). The appropriate disparate-
impact statistics should be guided by the trait protected 
by the statute, not the population of employees inside or 
outside the statute’s general scope. In fact, when the 
Supreme Court recognized ADEA disparate-impact 
liability in Smith, nothing in its reasoning turned on the 
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existence or purpose of § 631(a). That provision was not 
cited once.5 
 PGW and its amici would have us rewrite 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) to proscribe “adverse[] effect[s] . . . 
because of such individual’s [membership in the 40-and-
older class].” That interpretation would bring the ADEA 
closer to more familiar Title VII territory, but “[w]e have 
to read it the way Congress wrote it.” Meacham v. Knolls 
Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 101–02 (2008). The 
continuous, non-categorical nature of age cannot be 
adequately addressed by simply aggregating forty-and-
older employees. More exacting analysis may be needed 
in certain cases, and subgroups may answer that need. 
4 
 Finally, our decision is supported by the ADEA’s 
remedial purpose. Refusing to recognize subgroup claims 
would deny redress for significantly discriminatory 
policies that affect employees most in need of the 
ADEA’s protection. 
                                                 
 5 To be sure, the plaintiffs in Smith happened to 
rely on forty-and-older statistics. 544 U.S. at 242. 
Nothing in our opinion should be read to rule out such 
evidence. Nonetheless, Smith’s reasoning does not 
foreclose subgroup claims. 
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 Mandating a forty-and-older comparison group 
“would allow an employer to adopt facially neutral 
policies which had a profoundly disparate impact on 
individuals over age 50 or 55,” so long as younger 
individuals within the protected class received 
sufficiently favorable treatment. Finch v. Hercules Inc., 
865 F. Supp. 1104, 1129 (D. Del. 1994). Such policies 
“reflect the specific type of arbitrary age discrimination 
Congress sought to prohibit,” but would nonetheless 
evade judicial scrutiny. Id.; see also Graffam v. Scott 
Paper Co., 848 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Me. 1994). 
 We have also acknowledged in the disparate-
treatment context that “[i]f no intra-age group protection 
were provided by the ADEA, it would be of virtually no 
use to persons at the upper ages of the protected 
class . . . .” Maxfield, 766 F.2d at 792. The same rationale 
applies to the disparate-impact context. The older the 
employees affected by a policy, the more confounding 
favoritism would be included in the rigid forty-and-older 
sample. Thus, an impact on employees in their seventies 
may be easier to average out of existence compared to an 
impact that also affects younger employees. Mandating 
forty-and-older comparisons would predominantly harm 
“those most in need of the statute’s protection.” Lowe v. 
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1379 
(2d Cir. 1989) (Pierce, J., dissenting in relevant part). 
“[I]t would indeed be strange, and even perverse, if the 
youngest members of the protected class were to be 
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accorded a greater degree of statutory protection than 
older members of the class.” Id.6  
 Accordingly, our interpretation of the ADEA is 
supported not only by the statute’s text and Supreme 
Court precedent, but also by the ADEA’s purpose. 
C 
 Our holding in this case is at odds with decisions 
from three of our sister circuits. See Lowe v. Commack 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989); 
Smith v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 924 F.2d 1059, 1991 WL 
11271 (6th Cir. 1991) (table opinion); E.E.O.C. v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 
                                                 
 6 Ironically, mandating a forty-and-older sample 
has the potential to harm employers in certain 
circumstances. For example, if a substantial disparate 
impact is experienced only by individuals sixty-five and 
older, the effect can show up in the forty-and-older 
aggregate statistic, creating the misimpression that forty-
year-old plaintiffs were disparately impacted. See 
Ramona L. Paetzold & Steve L. Willborn, The Statistics 
of Discrimination: Using Statistical Evidence in 
Discrimination Cases § 7:2, at 340 (2016–2017 ed. 2016) 
(noting that “[t]he errors can occur in either direction” 
when relying on forty-and-older comparisons). 
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1999).7 Those decisions have primarily relied on policy 
considerations that we do not find persuasive. In short, 
they are contradicted by O’Connor and Teal, confuse 
evidentiary concerns with statutory interpretation, and 
incorrectly assume that recognizing subgroups will 
proliferate liability for reasonable employment practices. 
                                                 
 7 While we are generally reluctant to create circuit 
splits, we do so where a “compelling basis” exists. 
Wagner v. PennWest Farm Credit, ACA, 109 F.3d 909, 
912 (3d Cir. 1997). For the reasons discussed in this 
opinion, we think a compelling basis exists in this case. 
Even so, we note that (1) the Second Circuit and Sixth 
Circuit cases predate the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
O’Connor and Smith; (2) the Sixth Circuit case is non-
precedential; and (3) the Eighth Circuit case predates 
Smith. One circuit has noted the issue but declined to 
rule. See Katz v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 229 F.3d 
831, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 PGW and its amici argue that we already decided 
this question in Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 
F.2d 111, 121 (3d Cir. 1983). We did not. The plaintiff in 
Massarsky failed to advance any evidence of disparate 
impact. Id. Thus, its contemplation of a specific age 
group is dicta not binding on this panel. In any event, 
Massarsky predates the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
both O’Connor and Smith. 
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1 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit addressed disparate-impact subgroups in  Lowe v. 
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 
1989). See also Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 
102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997). Because Lowe predates 
O’Connor, it gives improper significance to the forty-
and-older line drawn by § 631(a), and fails to compare 
the textual similarities between § 623(a)(1) and 
§ 623(a)(2). Lowe also rejects subgroup claims because 
specific types of evidence could be misleading. We do 
not find Lowe persuasive. 
 The Second Circuit’s legal analysis begins with the 
premise that disparate-treatment analysis in Title VII 
cases “generally has focused . . . on the protected group 
of which plaintiff is a member.” Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1373. 
But Lowe does not address the text of § 623(a)(2). 
Divorced from that text, the Second Circuit allows the 
“general[] . . . focus[]” of a different statute to limit what 
this statute plainly permits. Lowe does not, and cannot, 
explain why forty-and-older group membership is 
“utterly irrelevant” to discrimination based on age, 
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O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312, but is the sine qua non of an 
adverse effect based on age.8 
 Lowe is primarily concerned with the practical 
implications of subgroup claims.9 Its main objection is 
                                                 
 8 Lowe’s treatment of Teal is similarly 
unpersuasive. See Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1374. We addressed 
the same argument in Section III.B.3, supra. 
 9 For example, Lowe offers a flawed reductio ad 
absurdum: “an 85 year old plaintiff could seek to prove a 
discrimination claim by showing that a hiring practice 
caused a disparate impact on the ‘sub-group’ of those age 
85 and above, even though all those hired were in their 
late seventies.” Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1373. This argument 
relies on the false assumption that an employer who 
favors 70-year-old employees could not possibly be 
liable under the ADEA. “If an 85-year old person . . . 
fails to attain that position for no reason other than age, 
s/he has suffered age discrimination under the Act . . . .” 
Id. at 1380 (Pierce, J., dissenting in relevant part). In any 
event, we can be reasonably assured that such a 
hypothetical would never arise due to the demographic 
characteristics of the workforce, which limit the 
statistical power to compare impacts on seventy- and 
eighty-year-old employees. See Sandra F. Sperino, The 
Sky Remains Intact: Why Allowing Subgroup Evidence Is 
Consistent with the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 227, 263 (2006). 
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evidentiary: “any plaintiff can take his or her own age as 
the lower end of a ‘sub-protected group’ and argue that 
said ‘sub-group’ is disparately impacted.” Lowe, 886 
F.2d at 1373. Here, PGW and its amici similarly argue 
that plaintiffs will be able to “gerrymander” arbitrary age 
groups in order to manufacture a statistically significant 
effect. We disagree. 
 Essentially, PGW and its amici argue that a 
particular form of evidence carries such a high risk of 
manipulation that we should interpret the ADEA to 
preclude the entire claim. That is a thoroughly 
unsatisfactory justification for ignoring statutory text and 
Supreme Court precedent.10 Our interpretation of the 
ADEA is based on text, not evidentiary gatekeeping. 
That function is capably performed by district judges 
who routinely apply the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
Daubert jurisprudence. We consider that to be a 
sufficient safeguard against the menace of unscientific 
methods and manipulative statistics. 
                                                 
 10 The Eighth Circuit, which ultimately agreed 
with Lowe’s outcome, did criticize the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning on this point. See E.E.O.C. v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 950–51 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(“The fact that a particular interpretation of a statute 
might spawn lawsuits is not a reason to reject that 
interpretation.”). 
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 Preliminarily, PGW’s “gerrymandering” objection 
only applies to the kind of statistical studies that compare 
subgroups selected by an expert. Some scholars have 
proposed the use of statistical models that treat age as a 
continuous variable and thus avoid the need to draw 
“arbitrary” age groups. Options discussed in the literature 
include proportional hazards models and logistic 
regression. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steve L. Willborn, 
The Statistics of Discrimination: Using Statistical 
Evidence in Discrimination Cases § 7:11, at 372 (2016–
2017 ed. 2016) [hereinafter Paetzold & Willborn]; see 
also, e.g., George Woodworth & Joseph Kadane, Age- 
and Time-Varying Proportional Hazards Models for 
Employment Discrimination, 4 Annals Applied Statistics 
1139 (2010); Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, 
Proportional Hazard Models for Age Discrimination 
Cases, 34 Jurimetrics J. 153 (1994). 
 We have no need today to bless any one approach. 
“Statistics ‘come in infinite variety and . . . their 
usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances.’” Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 n.3 (quoting 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977)). 
Our purpose is rather to demonstrate that the 
gerrymandering objection exposes a weakness in one 
particular research method, not a cause of action. “The 
continuous nature of the age variable need not be a 
statistical problem under disparate-impact analysis; 
existing statistical procedures can be adapted to the 
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specific needs of disparate-impact analysis.” Paetzold & 
Willborn § 7:11, at 373. 
 Even if the statistical evidence in an ADEA case 
uses age groups selected by the expert, PGW and its 
amici overstate the risk of manipulation. “The claim can 
be analyzed, of course, to determine if the result is robust 
across various age breaks and whether the age breaks can 
be justified independently of the data . . . .” Id. § 7:3, at 
344. In fact, some courts have long permitted statistical 
subgroup evidence in the context of disparate-treatment 
claims. See, e.g., Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 
1466–67 (6th Cir. 1990). We see no reason why that 
same evidence would be any less workable in a disparate-
impact case. See MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 
F.2d 1135, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he statistical 
evidence supporting a claim of disparate impact often 
resembles that used to help establish disparate 
treatment.”). 
 So-called “age-break” analysis has well-
understood limitations. See Paetzold & Willborn § 7:3, at 
343–46. For example, if an expert does not devise the age 
breaks independently of the data, and instead cherry-
picks groups to manufacture a particular result, that “may 
invalidate the usual tests of statistical significance.” Id. at 
341. In addition, “the appropriate inference for plaintiffs 
near a selected age break is always likely to be 
problematic.” Id. at 344–45. Without more, this challenge 
may undermine the claims of plaintiffs who “take [their] 
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own age as the lower end of a ‘sub-protected group’ and 
argue that said ‘sub-group’ is disparately impacted.” 
Lowe, 886 F.2d at 1373; see also Finch, 865 F. Supp. at 
1129–30 (“If a plaintiff attempts to define the subset too 
narrowly, he or she will not be able to obtain reliable 
statistics upon which to prove a prima facie case.”). 
 The EEOC and plaintiffs have only argued in favor 
of subgroups with “lower boundaries,” not “upper 
boundaries.” Oral Arg. Tr. 23:24–24:3. That rule would 
preclude, for example, a “banded” 50-to-55 subgroup. 
We think that limitation is well founded. A plaintiff 
would benefit from introducing an upper boundary if a 
policy favored employees older than that limit. But in 
Cline, the Supreme Court interpreted the term “age” in 
§ 623(a)(1) to mean “old age.” 540 U.S. at 596. Under 
Cline, the ADEA protects only “relatively old worker[s] 
from discrimination that works to the advantage of the 
relatively young.” Id. at 590–91. If a facially neutral 
policy systematically favors a company’s oldest 
employees,11 that fact may be fatal to a claim that 
                                                 
 11 We note that the ability to draw inferences about 
the treatment of a company’s oldest employees may be 
limited by sample size. In this case, for example, 
plaintiffs’ expert argues that there is no statistically 
significant effect on employees age sixty and older 
because “[t]here are only 14 terminations, which means 
the statistical power to detect a significant effect is very 
low.” A.244–45. 
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members of a younger subgroup were disparately 
impacted because of their “old age.” Id. at 596; see Tex. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. 
Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (describing 
the importance of “[a] robust causality requirement” in 
disparate-impact cases); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 
557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). Thus, a banded subgroup 
would be self-defeating under Cline, further limiting 
plaintiffs’ ability to gerrymander age groups. 
 We reject the notion that the risk of gerrymandered 
evidence is so great that it can override what the text of 
the statute otherwise permits. District courts should, as in 
any other case, ensure that plaintiffs’ evidence is reliable 
under Daubert and provides more than the “mere scintilla 
of evidence” needed to survive summary judgment. S.H. 
ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 
256 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 
770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, we are not 
persuaded by Lowe’s legal or practical groundings. 
2 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit addressed disparate-impact subgroups in a non-
precedential opinion, Smith v. Tennessee Valley 
Authority, 924 F.2d 1059, 1991 WL 11271 (6th Cir. 
1991) (table opinion). This decision also predates 
O’Connor. Its reasoning contradicts both O’Connor and 
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Teal, and conflicts with a precedential Sixth Circuit 
opinion that allows subgroup analysis in disparate-
treatment cases. 
 In Smith, the Sixth Circuit asserts by citation to 
Lowe that “[a] plaintiff cannot succeed under a disparate 
impact theory by showing that younger members of the 
protected class were preferred over older members of the 
protected class.” Id. at *4. As we have discussed, Lowe’s 
reasoning is explicitly rejected by O’Connor and Teal. 
Teal held that a plaintiff can succeed under a disparate-
impact theory if other members of the protected class 
were preferred, 457 U.S. at 454, and O’Connor held that 
forty-and-older status is irrelevant to evaluating the 
application of a protection based on “age,” 517 U.S. at 
312. 
 As we have also noted, the Sixth Circuit has long 
recognized statistical subgroup evidence in disparate-
treatment claims. In a precedential opinion, Barnes v. 
GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457 (6th Cir. 1990), the Sixth 
Circuit specifically rejected the defendant’s argument 
that “the only valid statistics would necessarily divide the 
employees into groups age 40-and-over and those under 
40.” Id. at 1466. The Sixth Circuit suggests in a footnote, 
by citation to Lowe, that “[s]uch sub-group analysis may 
not apply to discriminatory impact cases[.]” Id. at 1467 
n.12. With the exception of that speculative footnote, we 
find the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Barnes more 
persuasive than its decision in Smith. 
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3 
 Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit addressed disparate-impact subgroups in 
E.E.O.C. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948 
(8th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Circuit’s analysis is also 
unpersuasive because it contradicts Teal and ignores 
important limitations on the scope of disparate-impact 
claims. 
 First, the Eighth Circuit argued that if subgroup 
claims were cognizable,  
a plaintiff could bring a disparate-impact 
claim despite the fact that the statistical 
evidence indicated that an employer’s RIF 
criteria had a very favorable impact upon the 
entire protected group of employees aged 40 
and older, compared to those employees 
outside the protected group. We do not 
believe that Congress could have intended 
such a result. 
Id. at 951. This is no more than an endorsement of the 
bottom-line defense that the Supreme Court rejected in 
Teal. The State of Connecticut tried a similar argument 
by suggesting that black employees were favored for 
promotions as an overall class. But that bottom-line 
outcome concealed individual rights violations. Far from 
being a result “Congress could [not] have intended,” id., 
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the Supreme Court’s ruling in Teal vindicated Title VII’s 
plain text and purpose. The same applies to the ADEA. 
 Second, the Eighth Circuit panel wrote:  
[T]he consequence would be to require an 
employer engaging in a RIF to attempt what 
might well be impossible: to achieve 
statistical parity among the virtually infinite 
number of age subgroups in its work force. 
Adoption of such a theory, moreover, might 
well have the anomalous result of forcing 
employers to take age into account in making 
layoff decisions, which is the very sort of 
age-based decision-making that the statute 
proscribes. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d at 951.12 
 Even without the prospect of subgroups, it has 
always been the case that “a completely neutral practice 
will inevitably have some disproportionate impact on one 
group or another.” DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 731–32 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting City 
of L.A., Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
                                                 
 12 PGW’s amici make an opposite argument—that 
employers already fine-tune employment decisions to 
avoid creating a disparate impact, and our decision will 
make it more costly or complicated for them to do so. 
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702, 710 n.20 (1978)). That is precisely why deviating 
from statistical parity is not, by itself, enough to incur 
disparate-impact liability. Just last Term, the Supreme 
Court recognized that “disparate-impact liability has 
always been properly limited in key respects” so that it is 
not “imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical 
disparity.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 
2512; see also Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 (showing a 
statistical disparity alone “will not suffice to make out a 
prima facie case of disparate impact”); Watson, 487 U.S. 
at 994 (plurality opinion) (“[P]laintiff’s burden in 
establishing a prima facie case goes beyond the need to 
show that there are statistical disparities in the 
employer’s work force.”). 
 To make out a prima facie case, plaintiffs must 
first identify a specific employment practice that causes 
the disparity. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 642; see also 
Smith, 544 U.S. at 241 (noting that the Wards Cove 
holding remains in effect under the ADEA). The 
Supreme Court has recognized that this requirement 
guards against “the myriad of innocent causes that may 
lead to statistical imbalances.” Smith, 544 U.S. at 241 
(quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657). “Identifying a 
specific practice is not a trivial burden . . . .” Meacham v. 
Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 101 (2008); see 
Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (“[A] 
disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity 
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must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s 
policy or policies causing that disparity.”). 
 Furthermore, not just any disparity will make out 
the prima facie case; the disparity must be significant. 
See Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 (“[S]tatistical disparities 
must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an 
inference of causation.”); Teal, 457 U.S. at 446 (“[T]he 
facially neutral employment practice [must have] had a 
significantly discriminatory impact.”); Wards Cove, 490 
U.S. at 657 (requiring a “significantly disparate impact”); 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 
307–08 (1977) (requiring “gross statistical disparities”). 
We have not adopted a uniform rule for what this 
requirement entails; it must be evaluated “on a case-by-
case basis.” Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 n.3. 
 Finally, even if plaintiffs make out a prima facie 
case, the RFOA defense imposes a relatively light burden 
on employers. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 243. If a company’s 
oldest employees are inadvertently disadvantaged by a 
merit-based policy, for example, the RFOA defense is 
designed to address just such a scenario. See id. at 229 
(observing that Congress included the RFOA defense 
because age “not uncommonly has relevance to an 
individual’s capacity to engage in certain types of 
employment”). But if an employer can provide no 
reasonable justification for a policy that creates a 
significant age-based disparity, the ADEA prohibits that 
policy. 
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 In sum, the limitations applicable to any ADEA 
disparate-impact claim preclude liability for reasonable 
employment practices, regardless of subgroups. 
Nonetheless, as amici argue, our decision may very well 
require employers to be more vigilant about the effects of 
their employment practices. “But at the end of the day, 
amici’s concerns have to be directed at Congress, which 
set the balance where it is . . . . We have to read it the 
way Congress wrote it.” Meacham, 554 U.S. at 101–02; 
see Watson, 487 U.S. at 993–99 (plurality opinion) 
(explaining why “disparate impact theory need [not] have 
any chilling effect on legitimate business practices”). 
*          *          * 
 We conclude that ADEA disparate-impact claims 
are not limited to forty-and-older comparisons. While 
claims based on subgroups present unique challenges, the 
limitations applicable to any other disparate-impact 
case—evidentiary gatekeeping, the prima facie case, and 
affirmative defenses—are adequate safeguards. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s 
determination that PGW is entitled to summary judgment 
on this ground. 
IV 
 We now address the District Court’s second 
ground for granting summary judgment in favor of PGW: 
the exclusion of plaintiffs’ statistics expert under Daubert 
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and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. For the 
reasons that follow, we will vacate and remand for 
further Daubert proceedings regarding plaintiffs’ 
statistical evidence. We then turn to plaintiffs’ other 
expert reports, concluding that the District Court did not 
err in excluding each. 
A 
 Pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), district 
courts perform a gatekeeping function to ensure that 
expert testimony meets the requirements of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702. That function extends not only to 
scientific testimony, but also to other forms of 
“technical” or “specialized” knowledge. Fed R. Evid. 
702(a); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137, 141 (1999). “Rule 702 embodies three distinct 
substantive restrictions on the admission of expert 
testimony: qualifications, reliability, and fit.” Elcock v. 
Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 2000). This case 
presents issues of reliability and fit. 
 “In order for expert testimony to meet Daubert’s 
reliability standard, it must be based on the methods and 
procedures of science, not on subjective belief and 
unsupported speculation.” In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 
703–04 (3d Cir. 1999), amended, 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 
2000). “The test of admissibility is not whether a 
particular scientific opinion has the best foundation, or 
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even whether the opinion is supported by the best 
methodology or unassailable research.” Id. at 665. 
Instead, the court looks to whether the expert’s testimony 
is supported by “good grounds.” Id. at 665 (quoting In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717, 745 
(3d Cir. 1994)). The standard for reliability is “not that 
high.” Id. It is “lower than the merits standard of 
correctness.” Id. Each aspect of the expert’s opinion 
“must be evaluated practically and flexibly without 
bright-line exclusionary (or inclusionary) rules.” ZF 
Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 291 (3d Cir. 
2012) (quoting Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 
155 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 The “fit” requirement ensures that the evidence or 
testimony “[helps] the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” TMI, 193 F.3d 
at 663 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)). “This condition 
goes primarily to relevance.” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 591). 
 “We review a district court’s decision to admit 
expert testimony for abuse of discretion and exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s legal interpretation 
of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” United 
States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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B 
 Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Michael Campion, proposes 
to offer statistical evidence in support of the disparate-
impact claims. Specifically, Dr. Campion would testify 
that employees older than forty-five, fifty, and fifty-five 
years old were likelier to be fired in the March 2009 RIF 
than were younger employees. 
 The District Court identified three grounds13 for 
exclusion: (1) Dr. Campion used facts or data that were 
not reliable; (2) he failed to use a statistical adjustment 
called the Bonferroni procedure; and (3) his testimony 
lacks “fit” to the case because subgroup claims are not 
cognizable. For the reasons that follow, we will vacate 
the District Court’s order and remand for further Daubert 
proceedings.14 
                                                 
 13 The District Court assumed that Dr. Campion is 
qualified. We need not, then, address that issue. 
 14 Dr. Campion based his opinion on two analyses: 
one using the EEOC’s “four-fifths” test, see 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1607.4 (1987), and another using a more traditional 
statistical method, a z-score test. The District Court noted 
that the four-fifths test “has been criticized,” but may be 
“used in conjunction” with other statistical evidence. 
Karlo, 2015 WL 4232600, at *13 (citation omitted). That 
determination is not disputed on appeal. We therefore 
focus on the reliability of Dr. Campion’s z-score test. 
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1 
 First, the District Court concluded that Dr. 
Campion’s report should be excluded because it is not 
based on reliable data, contrary to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702(b). Specifically, Dr. Campion’s dataset 
included certain “Evart Terminees” who were not part of 
the “Agreed Data Set” to which the parties stipulated. We 
conclude that the District Court abused its discretion to 
the extent that it excluded Dr. Campion’s testimony on 
this basis because the District Court ignored, without 
explanation, Dr. Campion’s subsequent analysis. 
 Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Campion cured this 
deficiency, and the District Court’s opinion provides no 
reason to doubt their argument. Specifically, plaintiffs 
claim that Dr. Campion excluded the Evart Terminees 
and determined that it did not affect his conclusions. At 
oral argument, plaintiffs explained that the Evart 
Terminees “skewed the data actually in favor of more of 
the defendants,” Oral Arg. Tr. 5:6–7, whereas PGW 
insists that the Evart Terminees “skewed the data to favor 
Plaintiffs’ theory of the case.” Br. Appellee 29. 
 It is appropriate for the District Court to address 
this issue in the first instance. But the District Court 
noted plaintiffs’ counterargument without addressing it. 
To the extent that the District Court excluded Dr. 
Campion’s testimony based on problems that were cured 
by subsequent analysis, it abused its discretion. To the 
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extent that the subsequent analysis was deficient, the 
District Court also abused its discretion because it failed 
to provide any justification for discrediting that analysis. 
Because we will remand for further Daubert proceedings, 
as described below, the District Court will have the 
opportunity to revisit this issue. 
2 
 Next, the District Court determined that Dr. 
Campion “does not apply any of the generally accepted 
statistical procedures (i.e., the Bonferroni procedure) to 
correct his results for the likelihood of a false indication 
of significance. This sort of subgrouping ‘analysis’ is 
data-snooping, plain and simple.” Karlo, 2015 WL 
4232600, at *13. We conclude that the District Court 
applied an incorrectly rigorous standard for reliability. 
 The Bonferroni procedure makes it more difficult 
to find statistical significance where a researcher tests 
multiple comparisons using the same data. In theory, a 
researcher who searches for statistical significance in 
multiple attempts raises the probability of discovering it 
purely by chance, committing Type I error (i.e., finding a 
false positive). See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 
(1978) (describing Type I and Type II errors). The 
Bonferroni procedure adjusts for that risk by dividing the 
“critical” significance level by the number of 
comparisons tested. In this case, PGW’s rebuttal expert, 
Dr. James L. Rosenberger, argues that the critical 
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significance level should be p < 0.01, rather than the 
typical p < 0.05, because Dr. Campion tested five age 
groups (0.05 / 5 = 0.01).15 Once the Bonferroni 
adjustment is applied, Dr. Campion’s results are not 
statistically significant. Thus, Dr. Rosenberger argues 
that Dr. Campion cannot reject the null hypothesis and 
report evidence of disparate impact.16 
 Dr. Campion responds that adjusting the required 
significance level is generally required in a “data 
snooping” scenario where a researcher conducts “a huge 
number of analyses of all possibilities to try to find 
something significant.” A.239. In contrast to “data 
snooping,” Dr. Campion calls his methodology 
“hypothesis driven”; he evaluates the likelihood of 
termination on a small number of groups based on logical 
increments in age to discover “evidence that increasing 
age relates to increased likelihood of termination . . . .” 
                                                 
 15 Dr. Campion notes that he tested only four age 
groups, not five. Dr. Rosenberger tests a subgroup of 
sixty-and-older employees, which Dr. Campion did not 
include in his analysis because “[t]here are only 14 
terminations, which means the statistical power to detect 
a significant effect is very low.” A.244–45. 
 16 The relationship between statistical significance 
and admissibility is currently before this Court in In re 
Zoloft (Sertralinehydrochloride) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 
16-2247, appealing 176 F. Supp. 3d 483 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
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A.240. He also points out that “nearly all the tests are 
significant,” which makes his method analogous to 
“cross-validating the relationship between age and 
termination at different cut-offs,” or “replication with 
different samples.” A.241. And finally, Dr. Campion 
includes supplemental results that he claims “control for 
the error rate by conducting only one analysis . . . .” 
A.242. 
 We conclude that the District Court erred by 
applying a “merits standard of correctness,” a higher bar 
than what Rule 702 demands. TMI, 193 F.3d at 665. 
After identifying a potential methodological flaw, the 
District Court did not proceed to evaluate whether Dr. 
Campion’s opinion nonetheless rests on good grounds. 
Instead, it applied a “bright-line exclusionary . . . rule[],” 
ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 291, based on Dr. Campion’s 
failure to perform a specific arithmetical adjustment. As 
we have observed, there could be good grounds for an 
expert’s conclusion “even if the judge thinks that . . . a 
scientist’s methodology has some flaws such that if they 
had been corrected, the scientist would have reached a 
different result.” Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 744. 
 In certain cases, failure to perform a statistical 
adjustment may simply diminish the weight of an 
expert’s finding. See Paetzold & Willborn § 6:7, at 308 
n.2 (describing the Bonferroni adjustment as “good 
statistical practice,” but “not widely or consistently 
adopted” in the behavioral and social sciences); E.E.O.C. 
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v. Autozone, Inc., No. 00-2923, 2006 WL 2524093, at *4 
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2006) (“[T]he Court does not have 
a sufficient basis to find that . . . the non-utilization [of 
the Bonferroni adjustment] makes [the expert’s] results 
unreliable.”). The question of whether a study’s results 
were properly calculated or interpreted ordinarily goes to 
the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. See 
Leonard v. Stemtech Int’l Inc., 834 F.3d 376, 391 (3d Cir. 
2016). “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of 
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden 
of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of 
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 596; cf. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 
(1986) (“Normally, failure to include variables will affect 
the analysis’ probativeness, not its admissibility.”). 
 “That is not to say that a significant error in 
application will never go to the admissibility, as opposed 
to the weight, of the evidence.” In re Scrap Metal 
Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 2008). An 
expert’s failure to use a statistical adjustment may, in 
certain cases, present a “flaw . . . large enough that the 
expert lacks ‘good grounds’ for his or her conclusions.” 
Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 746; see Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 266–67 (N.D. Tex. 
2015) (applying a less conservative adjustment, Holm-
Bonferroni, based on “the substantial number of 
comparisons” made by the expert, and citing an article 
explaining that the risk of finding false significance is 
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prevalent where at least twenty to forty comparisons are 
tested). Nonetheless, “[t]he grounds for the expert’s 
opinion merely have to be good, they do not have to be 
perfect.” Paoli II., 35 F.3d at 744. “So long as the 
expert’s testimony rests upon ‘good grounds,’ it should 
be tested by the adversary process . . . rather than 
excluded from jurors[’] scrutiny for fear that they will not 
grasp its complexities or satisfactory [sic] weigh its 
inadequacies.” TMI, 193 F.3d at 692 (quoting Ruiz–
Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P. R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 
85 (1st Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, we will remand for 
further Daubert proceedings as to Dr. Campion’s 
statistics-related testimony to allow the District Court to 
apply the correct standard for reliability. 
3 
 Finally, the District Court determined that Dr. 
Campion’s statistics lacked fit to the case. “[T]he 
subgrouping analysis would only be helpful to the 
factfinder if this Court held that Plaintiffs could maintain 
an over-fifty disparate impact claim.” Karlo, 2015 WL 
4232600, at *13 n.16. Having held that plaintiffs’ over-
fifty disparate-impact claim is cognizable, we conclude 
that this ground for exclusion fails as well. Because each 
ground fails, we will vacate the District Court’s order 
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excluding Dr. Campion’s statistics-related testimony and 
remand for further Daubert proceedings.17 
C 
 Dr. Campion offered a second expert report on a 
different subject: reasonable human-resources (“HR”) 
practices. We conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony. 
 Dr. Campion intended to testify as to twenty 
“reasonable” HR practices that PGW could have, but did 
not, employ when conducting its RIFs. Plaintiffs aver 
that this testimony is necessary to rebut PGW’s RFOA 
defense. The District Court disagreed. It concluded that 
Dr. Campion’s HR testimony lacked relevance to the 
case because “plaintiffs c[ould] rebut Defendants’ RFOA 
defense only by demonstrating that the factors offered by 
Defendants [we]re unreasonable.” Karlo, 2015 WL 
4232600, at *15 (quoting Powell v. Dallas Morning 
News L.P., 776 F. Supp. 2d 240, 247 (N.D. Tex. 2011), 
aff’d 486 F. App’x 469 (5th Cir. 2012)) (alterations in 
original). 
 We agree. When a defendant proffers a RFOA, the 
plaintiff can rebut it by showing that the factor relied 
                                                 
 17 We do not reach the issue of whether the District 
Court abused its discretion by declining to hold a 
Daubert hearing. 
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upon is unreasonable, not by identifying twenty other 
practices that would have been reasonable instead. See 
Smith, 544 U.S. at 243 (“While there may have been 
other reasonable ways for the City to achieve its goals, 
the one selected was not unreasonable.”). 
 Plaintiffs also argue that PGW’s proffered RFOA 
fails as a matter of law. If true, that would eliminate the 
need for Dr. Campion’s HR testimony under plaintiffs’ 
own explanation for its relevance. But because the 
District Court did not grant summary judgment on the 
basis of PGW’s RFOA defense, the question of that 
defense’s legal sufficiency is not before us. 
D 
 Finally, the District Court excluded the testimony 
of Dr. Anthony G. Greenwald. Dr. Greenwald proposed 
to testify as to his experience with Implicit Association 
Tests (IAT), a type of test designed to measure “the 
strength of a mental association that links a social 
category (such as race, gender, or age group) with a trait 
(i.e., a stereotype) . . . .” A.405. Specifically, Dr. 
Greenwald reports that 80% of research participants hold 
an implicit bias based on age. He also evaluated the 
deposition transcripts of certain PGW employees and 
determined that their RIF procedures were susceptible to 
implicit biases. 
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 The District Court concluded that Dr. Greenwald’s 
testimony lacks fit to this case because his population-
wide statistics have only speculative application to PGW 
and its decision-makers. The District Court also observed 
that disparate-impact claims do not inquire into the 
employer’s state of mind. We agree. Plaintiffs are not 
required to prove that any particular psychological 
mechanism caused the disparity in question; they are 
only required to demonstrate that the disparity itself is 
“sufficiently substantial that [it] raise[s] such an 
inference of causation.” Watson, 487 U.S. at 995. That is 
not to say, however, that implicit-bias testimony is never 
admissible. Courts may, in their discretion, determine 
that such testimony elucidates the kind of headwind 
disparate-impact liability is meant to redress. We are 
simply unable here to conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. 
V 
 The final issue presented in this appeal is whether 
the District Court committed clear error in decertifying 
the collective action.18 We hold that it did not. 
                                                 
 18 Defendants argue that we should not reach this 
issue for two reasons. First, they argue that the four opt-
in plaintiffs were not named in the notice of appeal. We 
have rejected that argument in Section II of this opinion. 
Second, they argue that the Notice of Appeal failed to 
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 The collective action19 “is a form of group 
litigation in which a named employee plaintiff or 
plaintiffs file a complaint ‘in behalf of’ a group of other, 
initially unnamed employees who purport to be ‘similarly 
situated’ to the named plaintiff.” Halle v. W. Penn 
Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 
2016). Courts in this circuit use a two-step certification 
                                                                                                             
specify that plaintiffs sought review of the decertification 
order. We reject that argument as well. We exercise 
jurisdiction over orders not specified in a notice of appeal 
if: “[1] there is a connection between the specified and 
unspecified order, [2] the intention to appeal the 
unspecified order is apparent and [3] the opposing party 
is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the 
issues.” Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 972 (3d 
Cir. 1992). Each prong is met. The District Court’s 54(b) 
memorandum stated that “[T]he same reasons that 
warrant the certification of a final judgment on the 
disparate impact and disparate treatment claims also fully 
justify an immediate appeal on the decertification 
ruling.” Karlo, 2015 WL 5782062, at *4 n.2. Thus, 
defendants had full notice and opportunity to brief the 
issue. 
 19 “[T]he ADEA incorporates enforcement 
provisions of the [Fair Labor Standards Act], including 
the collective action provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).”  
Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 
215, 224 n.8 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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process. The first step, so-called conditional certification, 
requires the named plaintiffs to make a “modest factual 
showing” to demonstrate “a factual nexus between the 
manner in which the employer’s alleged policy affected 
him or her and the manner in which it affected the 
proposed collective action members.” Id. at 224. 
 The second step, final certification, is what is at 
issue here. “[T]he named plaintiffs bear the burden of 
showing that the opt-in plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated’ 
to them for FLSA purposes.” Id. at 226. “Being 
‘similarly situated’ . . . means that one is subjected to 
some common employer practice that, if proved, would 
help demonstrate a violation of the FLSA.” Id. (quoting 
Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 538 (3d 
Cir. 2012)). In determining whether plaintiffs are 
similarly situated, relevant factors include: 
whether the plaintiffs are employed in the 
same corporate department, division, and 
location; whether they advance similar 
claims; whether they seek substantially the 
same form of relief; and whether they have 
similar salaries and circumstances of 
employment. Plaintiffs may also be found 
dissimilar based on the existence of 
individualized defenses. 
Zavala, 691 F.3d at 536–37 (emphases added). A district 
court’s determination as to whether plaintiffs are 
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similarly situated is a finding of fact that we review for 
clear error. Zavala, 691 F.3d at 535. 
 In this case, the District Court properly relied on 
Zavala in determining that plaintiffs did not meet their 
burden to show that they are similarly situated. 
Specifically, the District Court observed that the nine 
plaintiffs “held seven different titles with varied job 
duties in two separate divisions of PGW and across five 
locations in which no less than six decision-makers 
independently included them in the RIF.” Karlo, 2014 
WL 1317595, at *18. The District Court also based its 
opinion on “[t]he existence of individualized defenses 
and procedural concerns . . . .” Id. at *19. Those 
considerations fall squarely within the factors listed in 
Zavala. 
 To be sure, the named plaintiffs and opt-in 
plaintiffs were each terminated in a single RIF that left 
full discretion in the hands of local managers. But the 
District Court did not clearly err when it concluded that 
“[t]he similarities among the proposed plaintiffs are too 
few, and the differences among the proposed plaintiffs 
are too many” for the case to proceed as a collective 
action. Zavala, 691 F.3d at 537–38. Such differences 
may undermine the “efficiencies for the judicial system 
through resolution in one proceeding of common 
issues . . . .” Halle, 842 F.3d at 223; see Zavala, 691 F.3d 
at 538 (“[T]hese common links are of minimal utility in 
streamlining resolution of these cases.”). 
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 Plaintiffs essentially concede this point, but argue 
that the “small class size” makes the class “easily 
manageable even with the presence of potentially 
individualized defenses and damages evidence.” Br. 
Appellant 34. We decline to read the statutory phrase 
“similarly situated” differently depending on the size of 
the collective action. 
 Plaintiffs are correct that the existence of separate 
defenses or damage calculations “does not vitiate 
automatically” the collective action. Lockhart v. 
Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 52 (3d Cir. 
1989) (emphasis added); cf. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (quoting 7AA 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kay Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure §1778, at 123–24 (3d 
ed. 2005)). But under the guidance we have provided in 
Zavala, a district court may determine that such 
differences are too pronounced for the case to proceed as 
a collective action. Under our deferential standard of 
review, we are simply unable to conclude that the District 
Court committed clear error. 
VI 
 We conclude that plaintiffs’ disparate-impact 
claims are cognizable under the ADEA. We will 
therefore vacate the District Court’s orders granting 
summary judgment in favor of PGW and excluding the 
statistics-related testimony of Dr. Campion. We will 
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remand for further Daubert proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. We will affirm the District Court in all other 
respects. 
